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THE EXCHANGE OF PRICE INFORMATION AS A
RESTRA]INT OF TRADE: REASSESSING PER SE
RULES IN LIGHT OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
CRAIG R. MAGINNESS*
INTRODUCTION
T HE market behavior of oligopolists,' particularly their ability to
combine for the purpose of stabilizing prices at a noncompetitive
level, has been the subject of critical scrutiny by the government and
by antitrust theorists over the past two decades. 2 The regulation of
* Attorney, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado. A.B Dartmouth
College, J.D. Syracuse University. Member of the Denver, Colorado, and American Bar
Associations.
1. The seminal work on industrial concentration in America is The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, originally published in 1932
Berle and Means found that, in 1929, the 200 largest corporations in America controlled 38% of
all business wealth and 22% of the total national wealth. A. Berle & G. Means. The Modern
Corporation and Private Property 33 (rev. ed. 1967). The authors also found that the gross assets
of 150 of these corporations had increased 63% between 1919 and 1928. or 5.6%, annually, and
had increased 31% between 1924 and 1928, an annual rate of 7.0%. Id. at 35. Based on these
figures, Berle and Means predicted that by 1950, 70% of all corporate activity would be carried
on by the 200 largest corporations, who would control half the national wealth Id at 41. The
steady trend of increased industrial concentration has continued. In 1929 the top 100 industrial
corporations controlled 25% of the total industrial corporate assets. R. Heilbroner, The Worldly
Philosophers 295 (4th ed. 1972). In 1960 the figure had increased to 31%, and by 1970 the top 100
industrial corporations controlled nearly 50% of corporate wealth in the United States Id.
2. It has been suggested that the attack on oligopolistic behavior dates from Brown Shoe Co
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Note, Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price
Information Among Competitors: The Container Corporation Case, 68 Mich. L, Rev- 720, 728
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Implications). The traditional focal points of antioligopolistic
cases prior to United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). had been joint
ventures, mergers, and consignment sales. Antitrust Implications, supra, at 728 & n.48 (citing
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint ventures). United States v-
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal mergers), and Simpson v Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13 (1964) (consignments)).
The problems of corporate size and market concentration have recently been subjected to
scrutiny by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Brozen, Concentration and Structural and
Market Disequilibria, in The Competitive Economy 259 (Y. Brozen ed. 1975); McGee, "Compe-
tition" and the Number of Firms: Economic Theory, in The Competitive Economy 25 (Y Brozen
ed. 1975). See generally Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (H. Goldschmid, H Mann,
J. Weston eds. 1974). Congress has also exhibited considerable concern about the problem of
industrial concentration. See, e.g., Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia,, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978); Economic Concentration: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Antitrust and Monopoly
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oligopolistic behavior through the Sherman Act,3 however, has pre-
sented some significant problems. Clearly, no single firm in an
oligopoly can be considered to have a monopoly or, without proof of
more than market power, to have "attempt[ed] to monopolize" within
the proscriptions of section 2 of the Sherman Act.4 Further, the
Supreme Court has held that "conscious parallelism" in an oligopoly is
not sufficient proof of the agreement necessary to establish a violation
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A special presidential
commission formed to study current problems in antitrust recommended the passage of a
Concentrated Industries Act which would permit the Justice Department to bring proceedings
against firms in an oligopoly market seeking decentralization in the same manner in which the
Department currently brings action against monopolies under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) No. 415 (Supp. May 26, 1969), discussed in Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force
Deconcentration Recommendation, in The Competitive Economy 113 (Y. Brozen ed. 1975).
Although that proposal has never been adopted, industrial concentration has remained under
close scrutiny. A recent address prepared by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti for the 13th
New England Antitrust Conference listed a "close study of concentrated industries" among the
top priorities of the Justice Department antitrust enforcement division. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
No. 413 at 5 (Nov. 27, 1979). In delivering that address, Acting Associate Attorney General John
Shenefield expressed support for new legislation that would impose liability for "unambiguously
anticompetitive conduct by firms with less than a near-monopoly market share." Id. at 10.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The effects of industrial concentration and oligopolistic markets
have been dealt with prophylactically through the antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976), but the provisions of the Clayton Act and attempts to regulate oligopolistic
behavior through antimerger legislation are beyond the scope of this Article.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Monopolization and attempt to monopolize are two distinct offenses.
The first requires that a two prong test be met: 1) the individual corporate defendant must possess
sufficient market power to control prices and exclude competition, and 2) the defendant must
possess a general intent to exercise the monopoly power. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). The requisite intent may be inferred from the existence of
monopoly power, however, when the monopoly power was obtained by illegal or abusive
business tactics, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), when the
monopoly power was lawfully obtained but is maintained by illegal or abusive tactics, United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954), or when the monopoly is lawfully obtained but is maintained through willful and
conscious business policies rather than natural competitive advantages, United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The degree of market power necessary to constitute a monopoly has
ranged somewhere between 75% and 95%. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966) (87%); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) (75-80%); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90%). The result of this
market power-general intent test is an offense which is essentially structural. Because of the
requirement of a substantial market share, no single firm in an oligopolistic market may be
prosecuted under the monopolization provision of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
The offense of attempt to monopolize condemns conduct rather than market structure, but
unlike monopolization requires a specific intent which "cannot be inferred merely from the
general course of the defendants' business acts or conduct." J. Von Kalinowski, 16 Business
Organizations-Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 8.01 at 8-4 (1979) (footnote omitted).
Thus, absent some specific evidence of an intent to monopolize, a firm in an oligopoly cannot be
attacked under the attempt provision of § 2. This raises many of the same problems discussed In
note 5 infra with respect to proving an agreement under § I of the Sherman Act.
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of section 1 of the Sherman Act (section 1).5 Therefore, the plaintiff
must prove an actual "contract, combination. . . or conspiracy"6 to fix
prices among the firms in a relevant market. This is not an easy
burden: there is no need for firms in a true oligopoly to agree expressly
to fix prices because it is arguably in each firm's interest to follow the
price leader. 7
In United States v. Container Corp. of America,8 the Justice De-
partment successfully circumvented this obstacle. The government first
established that competing firms had, by agreement, exchanged price
information. 9 It then argued that this information exchange had the
necessary effect of fixing prices, thereby constituting a violation of
section 1.10 Despite contradictory evidence,"1 the majority of the
5. Evidence of similar business behavior, even if consciously parallel, is not sufficient to
establish the requisite agreement. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954); Klein v. American Luggage Works. Inc., 323 F 2d 787, 791
(3d Cir. 1963); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, o61 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). Thus, in the typical oligopoly, more is required than
proof of similar prices or other similar modes of conduct.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
7. The fundamental theory of microeconomics, which regards profit maximization as a
primary goal of each individual firm, would suggest that firms in an oligopoly might best serve
this interest by colluding to charge higher prices than would otherwise be dictated by the
interaction of the supply and demand functions with each firms' marginal costs, thereby yielding
monopoly profits. See generally Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in The Competitive Economy 2 15
(Y. Brozen ed. 1975). As Stigler points out, however, in the real world, factors not considered in
pure economic theory may create an environment in which collusion is disadvantageous for
reasons other than price maximization. Id. at 217-18. Also, while there may be a decrease in price
competition in a particular product market that has become dominated by a few large firms, there
still may be a sufficiently high elasticity with other products so as to exert an influence on prices
vis-a-vis other product markets. R. Heilbroner, supra note 1, at 298.
8. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
9. Although the violation charged in Container Corp. was an agreement to fix prices, the
government proved only that the firms had requested price information from competitors when it
was unavailable from other sources. Despite the infrequency of these informal exchanges, the
Court found that the combination or conspiracy requirement of § 1 was satisfied. Id. at 335; see
note 39 infra and accompanying text.
10. The government argued that the information exchange must inevitably result in price
stabilization because of the defendants' 90% market share, and the Court found the inference
"irresistible." Id. at 337. Yet the same inference could be drawn in any restraint of trade case
involving oligopolists, since knowledge of the market conditions is generally available. In fact,
much of the information exchanged in Container Corp. was available from each defendant's own
records or from its customers. Id. at 335. Save for the evidence of the exchange information, the
case was virtually indistinguishible from decisions that have held conscious parallelism to be
insufficient as evidence of the requisite agreement. See cases cited note 5 supra.
11. Despite the low elasticity of demand between corrugated cardboard containers and other
potential substitutes, the low entry barriers seemed to prohibit the defendants from raising their
prices beyond the level dictated by normal market factors. The industry had expanded sig-
nificantly in recent years, and prices had experienced a downward trend. Id. at 336. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the government relied exclusively on its oligopoly theory and did not call a
single customer to testify to the actual profits or price levels within the industry. Id. at 345
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court accepted the government's position.' 2 The Court's
application of the per se rule' 3 against horizontal price fixing resulted
in a holding that the very exchange of price information in an arguably
oligopolistic market is, in itself, a restraint of trade in violation ot
section 1.
Container Corp. was decided while the commercial speech exception
to the first amendment was a viable doctrine. 14 Seven years later,
12. The Court held that, even though prices were subject to a downward trend, the very fact
of an effect on prices brought the case within the rule of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co.. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 393 U.S. at 337.
13. Per se rules operate to create a conclusive presumption that a particular practice is illegal
despite any lack of actual anticompetitive effect in a particular case. The rationale for per se rules
is that "there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Many cases have
applied per se rules. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)
(tying arrangements); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467
(1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socon'-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price
fixing); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (market allocation). See also notes 125-28 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
justifications for per se rules).
14. The commercial speech exception had its genesis in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). Although voicing its traditional concern for the protection of speech from unduly
burdensome government regulation, the Chrestensen Court, upholding the appellant's conviction
under an ordinance banning public distribution of commercial advertisements, stated that "the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government [regulation] as respects purely commercial
advertising." Id. at 54. Initially, the test for determining when speech was purely commercial was
based on the speaker's motive. Compare BRreard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door canvassing upheld where defendant was soliciting popular magazine
subscriptions) with Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
solicitation held invalid with respect to distribution of advertising for a religious meeting) and
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ordinance requiring licensing of door-to-door
canvassing held invalid with respect to distribution of religious literature, notwithstanding the
nominal charge for the material). In the three decades following Chrestensen the commercial
speech exception was treated equivocally by the Court. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), the Court allowed the newpaper to raise a first amendment defense to a libel suit
even though the statements were contained in a paid commercial advertisement. Relying on the
political content of the advertisement rather than its format, the Court stated that the publication
"was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen.
... That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection
as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold." Id. at 266. Nevertheless, in Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), the Court distinguished
Sullivan on the basis of the content of a newspaper advertisement in order to uphold the
commission's ban on sex-designated column headings for classified advertisements. Id. at 384-85.
The Court stated that first amendment protection was unavailable because the classified adver-
tisements under scrutiny represented "classic examples of commercial speech." Id. at 385. The
underlying rationale of the decision, however, was not so much that the speech involved was
commercial as that the use of gender-based classifications was contrary to public policy. This
approach was followed by other courts. See Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161
(7th Cir. 1974) ("for sale" sign proposes a commercial transaction; municipal ordinance banning
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however, the Supreme Court held that "commercial speech, like other
varieties, is protected"15 by the first amendment, and the following
year held that a regulation that "impairs 'the flow of truthful and
legtimate commercial information' is constitutionally infirm., 6 Conse-
quently, the extension of this first amendment protection to price
information raises significant questions concerning the application of
the Court's analysis in Container Corp. to future cases involving the
exchange of price information by competitors.
Accordingly, this Article is concerned with the first amendment
rights of antitrust defendants 17 and the resultant effect on the eviden-
tiary burden in a price information exchange case. The Article begins
with a discussion of the development of the Court's price exchange
analysis and the application of the per se rule, 18 and then discusses the
parameters of the first amendment protection afforded commercial
speech. 19 After examining the interrelationship of these two discrete
aspects of the exchange of price information, 20 the Article contends
that the government should not be permitted to rely on speech among
competitors as the only significant evidence of a Sherman Act viola-
tion, as was permitted in Container Corp. 21 It is asserted that, in all
such signs upheld as preventing racial discrimination in housing). But see Linmark Assocs_, Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), discussed at notes 73-78 infra and accompanying
text. By 1975 the Court had become so dissatisfied with the inconsistent application of the
commercial speech exception that it expressly overturned the assumption "that advertising, as
such, [is] entitled to no First Amendment protection." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825
(1975). It has been suggested that reliance on the commercial speech exception "was so infrequent
that it has a history but barely any development." Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a
Chimera, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 45, 45-46 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the exception seems to
have deterred the raising of first amendment issues in the first instance. Thus, any claim of a
violation of first amendment rights is conspicuously lacking in Container Corp. itself.
15. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976). While Virginia Pharmacy did not present the issue of commercial speech in the
antitrust context, it is worth noting that the content of the speech which the Board of Pharmacy
sought to suppress was strictly limited to the price at which products were sold. Id. at 761. It is
dear, therefore, that the content of a price exchange is within the general ambit of the Court's
reversal of the commercial speech exception.
16. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977).
17. While defendants in price information exchange cases will invariably be corporations, the
Supreme Court has expressly held that the worthiness of speech for first amendment protection
"does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
18. See pt. I infra.
19. See pt. II infra.
20. See pt. III infra.
21. As the majority opinion stated in Container Corp., "all that was present was a request by
each defendant of its competitor for information as to the most recent price charged or quoted."
393 U.S. at 335. It is conceded here, however, that if the government were to prove with
competent economic evidence that an information exchange is intended to be or is in fact used to
stabilize prices at a noncompetitive level, then it should be held that the regulation is constitu-
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
information exchange cases, the government should be required to
prove an intent to maintain noncompetitive prices or the actual
maintenance of such prices by introducing significant economic data
relating to supply, demand, marginal costs, marginal revenue, and
other market data2 2 necessary to prove a restraint of trade. Courts
should then base their decisions on whether the evidence establishes a
course of conduct, in conjunction with the speech, that is intended to
achieve, or that results in, fixed prices. Such an approach prevents the
direct regulation of speech, in contravention of the first amendment,
that the continued application of Container Corp.'s lesser burden of
proof would permit.
I. INFORMATION EXCHANGES AND THE APPLICATION OF PER SE
RULES
By adopting the theoretical approach to information exchange anal-
ysis advocated by the Justice Department in Container Corp., the
Supreme Court departed from its earlier exchange decisions. The
Court acknowledged that "[t]he case as proved is unlike any other
price decisions we have rendered." 23 Rather than focusing on the
procedural details of the price exchange to determine the degree to
which sufficient evidence of price fixing was introduced, the Court
looked to the structure of the market in which the exchange took place
to find the necessary effect on prices. 24
A. The Pre-Container Corp. Analysis
In the early case of American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 2 5 the Supreme Court condemned a plan whereby manufacturers
of hardwood exchanged detailed information regarding inventory,
production, shipments, prices, and the names of customers. The
information was disseminated in digests supplemented by business
analysis and suggestions, and was discussed at regular meetings. The
tionally permissible as a secondary restriction on speech incident to a valid regulation of
non-speech activity. See notes 105-19 infra and accompanying text.
22. While specific figures on marginal cost and revenues should be the best indicator of
monopoly profits, it is acknowledged that this data is not always significant on other than a
theoretical basis. At the very least, however, the government should be required to introduce
evidence of actual prices charged in the particular market. Cf., United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333, 345 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (government failed to introduce
evidence of price levels).
23. Id. at 334.
24. Id. at 336-37. One commentator has suggested that Container Corp. may be read so
broadly as to lay "the basis for the use of economic theory to shorten the process of proving the
anticompetitive effects of both formal and informal exchanges of all types of price information by
a whole;ale incorporation of interdependence theory into the law of section 1." Note, Antitrust
Liability for an Exchange of Price Information-What Happened to Container Corporation?, 63
Va. L. Rev. 639, 656 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Liability].
25. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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Court found the exchange of detailed information, coupled with the
agreement's enforcement provisions, 26 objectionable:
[The plan is] not the conduct of competitors but is so clearly that of men united in an
agreement, express or implied, to act together and pursue a common purpose under a
common guide that, if it did not stand confessed a combination to restrict production
and increase prices in interstate commerce and as, therefore, a direct restraint upon
that commerce, ... that conclusion must inevitably have been inferred from the facts
which were proved. 27
This "inevitable inference" must have been based on the extreme
conduct of the defendants rather than on the market structure in which
they operated, for the 365 participants in the plan operated only 470 of
the region's 9,000 lumber mills, and accounted for only about one-third
of the national hardwood production. 28
The importance of conduct evidence within the pre-Container Corp.
analysis, as opposed to inferences based upon market theory, is further
illustrated by Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United
States, 29 which has been "referred to as the Magna Carta of statistical
reporting programs. ' 30 In Maple Flooring, the defendants were
twenty-two corporations that produced almost seventy-five percent of
finished flooring shipped in interstate commerce. 3' The government
proposed a theory strikingly similar to that on which it was to rely in
Container Corp., arguing that "the effect of the activities of the
defendants carried on under the plan of the Association must necessar-
ily be . . . to maintain prices."'32 The district court accepted the
government's position, and stated that the information exchange "had
a direct and necessary tendency to destroy competition . ..had at all
times a controlling influence to impeding the economic laws of supply
26. The express agreement entered into by the members of the defendant association in
American Column & Lumber provided that "[a]ny member who fails to report shall not receive
the reports of the secretary, and failure to report for twelve days in six months shall cause the
member failing to be dropped from membership." Id. at 395 (emphasis in original). The Court
also noted that compliance was fostered by the real threat of "trade punishment by powerful
rivals." Id. at 399. No such provisions existed, or at least none was proved, with respect to the
implied agreement relied on in Container Corp.
27. Id. at 410.
28. Id. at 391; id. at 413 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court devoted a considerable
portion of its opinion to the specificity of the membership's suggestions, which evidenced an
intent to fix prices. Id. at 401-09. The Court's emphasis was similar in United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1923).
29. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
30. Antitrust Implications, supra note 2, at 723 (citing G. Lamb & S. Kittelle, Trade
Association Law and Practice 33 (1956)). Included with Maple Flooring in this description was
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), which created a limited
exception from antitrust liability when the exchange of specific price information is necessary to
prevent active fraud. Cement Manufacturers, along with the other earlier price exchange cases,
was distinguished by the Container Corp. Court. 393 U.S. at 334-35,
31. 268 U.S. at 565-66.
32. 268 U.S. at 568.
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and demand [and] that in consequence the actual results flowing
from such a plan and the execution of it are of secondary impor-
tance." 33 Thus, the market power wielded by the defendants was
apparently a weighty factor in the district court's decision.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court holding.34
Despite proof of an overt agreement to exchange and discuss informa-
tion regarding inventory, production costs and volume, shipping costs
point-to-point, and actual prices charged in past transactions, the
Court found that section 1 had not been violated because the evidence
had failed to establish any agreement to take "concerted action with
respect to prices or production or restraining competition. '3  The
Court indicated, however, its unquestioned belief that information
exchanges lead to stabilization and price uniformity within an indus-
try.36 Thus, in holding that the exchange of information among
members of the Association was not an illegal restraint of trade, the
Court refused to base a violation on the necessary effect that such
information would have on prices. The Court stated that to do so
would be to condemn "the intelligent conduct of business opera-
tions."'37 Instead, the Court required "the character of the information
... and the use which was made of it" 38 to be such as would lead to
the irresistible conclusion that the defendants engaged in concerted
action to affect prices if the government were to prove a proper case.
B. Container Corp. and Its Implications
In Container Corp., the Court was presented with facts which were
similar in some key respects to Maple Flooring. Admittedly, no express
agreement was involved in Container Corp., but the Court had little
difficulty finding the requisite agreement on the facts. 39 A comparable
33. Id. at 575.
34. The direct appeal to the Supreme Court was made possible by the Expediting Act of
February 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)).
35. 268 U.S. at 586.
36. Id. at 582.
37. Id. at 583.
38. Id. at 584 (emphasis added). In his dissenting opinion in Container Corp., Justice
Marshall noted that "the evidence establishes that the information was used by defendants as
each pleased and was actually employed for the purpose of engaging in active price competition."
393 U.S. at 344. In light of the majority's opinion, it is clear that the Court in Container Corp.
was concerned only with the character of the information and the character of the market in
which it was exchanged, rather than the use which was made of it. Id. at 334-35.
39. The majority in Container Corp. found that "all that was present was a request by each
defendant of its competitor for information as to the most recent price charged or quoted,
whenever it needed such information and whenever it was not available from another source.
Each defendant on receiving that request usually furnished the data with the expectation that it
would be furnished reciprocal information when it wanted it. That concerted action is of course
sufficient to establish the combination or conspiracy, the initial ingredient of a violation of § I of
1012 [Vol. 48
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number of firms was involved, 40 and in both cases the defendant firms
controlled a high percentage of the relevant market. 4 ' Although Justice
Douglas attempted to distinguish Container Corp. from Maple Floor-
ing based on the different type of information exchanged in each
case, 42 the distinction was of little consequence in the decision because
the Court found the structure of the market, rather than the conduct of
the defendants, to be controlling. 43 In addition, Container Corp. found
that stabilization of prices resulting from an exchange of price infor-
mation was an irresistible inference; 44 Maple Flooring found the same
conclusion "not ... open to question." 45 Despite these similarities, the
results of the two cases were directly opposite.
The divergent results may be explained by Justice Douglas's reliance
on the intervening case of United States v. Socony-Vacuuni Oil Co.4 6
Socony-Vacuum involved an express agreement among several major
oil refining companies to buy the surplus gasoline of smaller indepen-
dent suppliers who, due to inadequate storage facilities, would oth-
erwise have sold it at prices that would have depressed the entire
industry. Although there was no agreement on resale price levels as
such, the Court found that the plan to buy the surplus gasoline was a
price fixing agreement within the scope of section 1.4 7 Having estab-
lished that the scheme was an agreement to fix prices, the Court held
that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per
the Sherman Act." 393 U.S. at 335 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the Court found that the case
was "obviously quite different from the parallel business behavior condoned in Theatre Enter.
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 C(1954)]." Id at 335 n.2.
40. Eighteen firms were defendants in Container Corp. 393 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J_
dissenting). Twenty-two were involved in Maple Flooring. 268 U.S. at S65.
41. In Container Corp. the defendants controlled 90% of the market, 393 L S at 342
(Marshall, J., dissenting), and the defendants in Maple Flooring controlled 74.2%, 268 U S_ at
566. It should also be noted that, because of the low entry barriers, the market in Container Corp.
was becoming less concentrated, expanding from "30 manufacturers with 49 plants to 51
manufacturers with 98 plants" during the period covered by the complaint. 393 U.S- at 336-
42. Justice Douglas noted that the defendants in Maple Flooring exchanged only average cost
figures while the information exchanged in Container Corp. identified specific sales and custom-
ers. 393 U.S. at 334-35. There is some indication in Maple Flooring, however, that the use of
standardized point-to-point freight rates enabled the defendants to calculate more nearly exact
prices. 268 U.S. at 571-72. Further, in at least some instances, the specificity to which Justice
Douglas referred to in Container Corp. depended on the use of "manuals with which [the
defendants] could compute the price charged by a competitor on a specific order to a specific
customer." 393 U.S. at 336.
43. 393 U.S. at 336-37.
44. Id. at 337.
45. 268 U.S. at 582.
46. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
47. Id. at 224.
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se. "48 Thus, under Socony-Vacuum a violation of section 1 is estab-
lished whenever there is an agreement which affects, or has the
purpose of affecting, the normal competitive price mechanism, regard-
less whether that price moves upward, downward, or is stabilized, and
regardless of "the machinery employed." 49
In Container Corp., Justice Douglas indicated that the exchange of
price information is one form of "machinery" by which competitors
can interfere "with the setting of price by free market forces" so as to
be illegal per se under Socony-Vacuum.5 0 Unlike the sweeping per se
rule in Socony-Vacuum, which is applicable even in markets in which
the combined power of the conspirators does not approach control,51
Justice Douglas's formulation is limited to a market with structural
characteristics similar to those under scrutiny in Container Corp.
Accordingly, Justice Douglas stated that "[p]rice information ex-
changed in some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive
price,"'52 but held that Socony-Vacuum applied to the corrugated
container industry because "[t]he inferences are irresistible that the
exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect."5 3
Justice Fortas's concurring opinion further illustrates the emphasis
on market structure found in Container Corp. Justice Fortas initially
stated that he understood the Court's opinion to apply a rule of reason
rather than a per se rule. 54 Nevertheless, he declared that the purpose
of the exchange of price information in the case-namely, determining
the price to be quoted to the individual customer--"inevitably suggests
the probability that [the price exchange] so materially interfered with
the operation of the price mechanism of the marketplace as to bring it
within the condemnation of this Court's decisions. '5 5 This language
implies that the test for the legality of information exchanges is a rule
of reason only in as much as it does not condemn the practice in every
case. Instead, the practice may be upheld when the defendants do not
possess significant market power. If, however, as in Container Corp.,
the market structure gives rise to an "irresistible inference," or, in
Justice Fortas's phrase, an "inevitable suggestion" of price interfer-
ence, information exchanges are illegal per se under the Socony-
Vacuum rationale.
Container Corp. has been described as creating a middle ground in
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id.
50. 393 U.S. at 337. Ironically, Socony-Vacuum expressly distinguished Maple Flooring on
the grounds that a price exchange is not an agreement to fix prices. 310 U.S. at 217.
51. 310 U.S. at 224.
52. 393 U.S. at 337.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 339 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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antitrust analysiss 6 between the structural offense of monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act s 7 and the traditional behavioral
offenses under section 1 .S8 The structural component requires proof of
sufficient market power to raise an inference of intent or effect, such as
that relied on in Container Corp. When this requisite is met, the
section 1 requirement of an agreement remains, proof of which must
rely on evidence of conduct. Because firms in an oligopoly have no
need to agree to fix prices as such, the government was permitted to
rely on the exchange of price information as sufficient evidence of a
section 1 agreement. From a first amendment vantage point, the
dangerous result of this analysis is that criminal and civil penalties
may ultimately be based on nothing more than evidence of an exchange
of information. If the plaintiff were able to attribute to the defendants
the requisite degree of market power, the Container Corp. test would
permit a finding that defendant's speech concerning prices is a restraint
of trade in and of itself.
5 9
II. THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AFFORDED COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
The commercial speech exception to the first amendment is well
documented, 60 and a historical digression would be of little benefit. It
is important, however, to understand the first amendment test for
protected speech which has developed through the Court's recent
decisions. Questions remain as to the exact test which should be
applied, 61 but it is clear that the protection to be afforded commercial
speech is considerable.
56. See Antitrust Implications, supra note 2, at 728.
57. Offenses under § 2 are considered structural because the analysis depends on whether the
defendant possesses the requisite degree of control in the relevant market, described in terms of a
percentage share of the market. Thus, if a given firm controls 70 to 100% of a relevant market, it
may be considered a monopoly in violation of § 2. See note 4 supra.
58. Other offenses under § 1 include allocations, group boycotts, and tying arrange-
ments. See generally L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 79-82, 83-92, 150.62
(1977).
59. At least one commentator has gone so far as to argue that the Container Corp. Court did
not intended to analyze information exchanges as an element of a price fixing offense, but
intended to create an entirely new analysis for price exchanges as an offense in itself. See
Antitrust Liability, supra note 24, at 655-56.
60. See, e.g., Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 45;
Note, The Effect of First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech on Municipal Sign
Ordinances, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 941 (1978).
61. See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa
L. Rev. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffties, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Redish, The First Amendment in the Markelplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1971);
Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205 (1976).
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A. Commercial Speech as Protected Speech
The first indication of the demise of the commercial speech exception
came in Bigelow v. Virginia.62 Bigelow, the defendant, had placed a
newspaper advertisement describing abortion services available in
New York, and had been convicted under a Virginia statute prohibit-
ing persons from encouraging the procurement of abortions. On ap-
peal, the state argued that the case was outside the purview of the first
amendment protection claimed by the defendant because the informa-
tion had appeared in the form of a commercial advertisement. In
rejecting the state's argument, the Bigelow Court held that it was no
longer valid to assume that information is entitled to no first amend-
ment protection solely because it appears in a paid advertisement. 63
Instead, the Court applied a three step balancing test-first, ascertain-
ing the public interest in the speech; second, ascertaining whether a
substantial government interest was served by regulation; and third,
determining whether the method of regulation adopted was the least
restrictive means. 64 In ruling that the statute was unconstitutional,
however, the Court relied more on the important social significance of
the information contained in the advertisement in question than on a
clear desire to overrule the commercial speech exception.65
Any doubts concerning the exception were laid to rest one year later
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 66 Overturning a statute which forbade advertisements
that did nothing more than propose a sale of" 'the X prescription drug
at the Y price,' "67 the Court squarely held that "commercial speech,
like other varieties, is protected. ' 68 Although it has been argued that
the Court reached this result by applying a balancing test similar to
that used in Bigelow, 69 the language employed by the Court suggests a
stronger position was taken, one reminiscent of the first amendment
"absolutists. ' '70 Thus, while discussing the interests of the speakers,
62. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
63. Id. at 825.
64. Id. at 826-29. For a discussion of the Bigelow test, see Roberts, Toward a General Theory
of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 115, 121-26 (1979).
65. 421 U.S. at 822.
66. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
67. Id. at 761.
68. Id. at 770.
69. Roberts, supra note 64, at 127.
70. The approach taken by the absolutists is to determine whether the speech falls within a
defined category of speech which is either protected or unprotected. If the speech falls within one
of the protected categories, then the government is without power to regulate its dissemination
except by a valid time, place, or manner restriction, regardless of interests involved. See
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24 (1971). See generally G. Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law: Cases and
Materials 647-50 (1976).
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listeners, and the government, the Court ultimately concluded that the
choice between the suppression of potentially harmful speech and the
dissemination of corrective speech 7l "is not ours to make or the
Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, be-
tween the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us." 7 2 The Court thereby acknowledged its own inability to condone
restrictions on the content of legitimate commercial speech.
The strength of this first amendment protection is further evidenced
in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,73 decided the
term following Virginia Phamnacy. In Linmark, the Court was faced
with an ordinance prohibiting the use of front lawn "For Sale" signs as
a means of advertising real estate. The underlying purpose of the
ordinance was to prevent the practice of "blockbusting.17 4 As in
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court expressly recognized the strength of the
government's interest.75 The Court, however, was not persuaded that
the ban on the signs was necessary to accomplish the government's
objective,7 6 thereby indicating at least recognition of the third element
of the Bigelow test. In the final analysis, however, the Justices "were
convinced that in any event, the First Amendment disabled the State
from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful informa-
tion."177 The Court further expressed its distaste for the repression of
speech, and stated that " 'more speech, not enforced silence' " is the
remedy for speech that is perceived to have a harmful effect.7 8
B. Commercial Speech Versus Other Varieties
Despit2 the emphatic language in the texts of Virginia Pharmacy
and Linmark, the language of footnote twenty-four to the Virginia
71. In this context "corrective speech" means information disseminated by the government
which is intended to combat the perceived evil inherent in the speech which, absent first
amendment constraints, the government would otherwise seek to enjoin. As stated in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), "[ilf there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
72. 425 U.S. at 770.
73. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
74. "Blockbusting" is the intentional inducement of white families to sell their houses based
on claims by a real estate agent that minority families are moving into the neighborhood. The
practice of blockbusting has been recognized as against public policy, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City
of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1973), fft'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), and has
been legislated against by the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976). See generally
Comment, Control of Panic Selling by Regulation of "For Sale" Signs, 10 Urb. L, Ann. 323
(1975).
75. 431 U.S. at 95.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 97 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J,
concurring)).
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Pharmacy opinion has caused confusion regarding the degree of pro-
tection to be afforded commercial speech:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have
not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense
differences between speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion," and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that
commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State,
they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that
the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired."9
It has been argued that this footnote was meant to indicate that
regulations of commercial speech are generally subject to a less strict
standard of scrutiny than those affecting non-commercial speech. 80 In
the context of the Virginia Pharmacy opinion, however, the statement
appears to have no such broad import. The footnote is appended to a
textual statement which allows that the State is not prevented from
dealing effectively with commercial speech that is "deceptive or mis-
leading," although not "provably false."'8 1 Speech having political or
social utility may be regulated if it is empirically false, 8 2 but may not
be regulated simply because the format in which it is presented or
because some opinion which pertains to it tends to mislead the
recipient. 83 This is the distinction which the Court thought unneces-
sary to apply to commercial speech. Because the Court perceived
commercial speech to be "more easily verifiable" and "more durable
than other kinds," it was thought to be "less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. '84 Following
79. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (citations omitted).
80. Roberts, supra note 64, at 126-32.
81. 425 U.S. at 771. The rationale for this position, as given by the Court in footnote 24, is
that: "The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be
more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.
"Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make
it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. They may also
make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being decep-
tive. They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints." 425 U.S. at 771
n.24 (citations omitted).
82. As the Court stated in Virginia Pharmacy, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,
has never been protected for its own sake." Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n. 10 (1961)).
83. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-73 (1964). See generally Meiklejohn,
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 Cal. W.L. Rev. 430 (1977).
84. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24..
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this same logic, the Court also suggested that the prohibition against
prior restraints might not apply to commercial speech.8 5
Therefore, the import of the "commonsense difference" between
commercial speech and other varieties of speech seems to be this: the
Court would permit a prior restraint of commercial speech to deter-
mine if it were intrinsically or extrinsically misleading,8 6 and permit its
regulation if either were found to be the case. If the Court were to
decide, however, that the speech is neither intrinsically nor extrinsi-
cally deceptive, then it would be entitled to the same degree of
protection as any other truthful speech. Whether this resulting protec-
tion is under an absolutist content or a strict balancing test,8 7 the
protection afforded is clearly formidable. 88
The Court's concluding statements in Linnark substantiate this
analysis of the intended scope of footnote twenty-four. Following its
quotation of the "commonsense difference" language from Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court concluded that "[1laws dealing with false or
misleading signs, and laws requiring such signs to 'appear in such a
form, or include such additional information . . . as [is] necessary to
prevent [their] being deceptive,' therefore, would raise very different
constitutional questions. '89 Without deciding those questions, the
Lininark Court simply and resolutely held that an ordinance "which
impairs 'the flow of truthfur and legitimate commercial information' is
constitutionally infirm." 90
M. THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON THE
GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN OF PROOF IN INFORMATION
EXCHANGE CASES
A. The Public Interest in Information Exchange
The speech at issue in information exchange cases such as Container
Corp. is clearly deserving of first amendment protection under the new
commercial speech rationale. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy ac-
85. Id.
86. As used here, "intrinsically misleading" means that the information is false in and of itself.
Intrinsically misleading speech is not "protected for its own sake" be it "commercial or oth-
erwise." 425 U.S. at 771. "Extrinsically misleading" means that the information itself is not false,
but some external circumstance renders it deceptive or misleading.
87. For a discussion comparing the absolutist approach with a balancing test, see Roberts,
supra note 64, at 124 n.64.
88. Even Professor Roberts, who argues that the Court has created a less exacting standard
for regulation of commercial speech, states that the standard "is far from undemanding-" Id. at
138. He also points out that five of the six leading commercial speech cases to have been decided
in the past decade "resulted in decisions favorable to the first amendment interests." Id. (footnote
omitted).
89. 431 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
90. Id.
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knowledged that the effective allocation of resources in a free enter-
prise economy depends on "numerous private economic decisions," and
that the public interest lay in ensuring that "those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed." 91 Recognizing "society's
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information," one noted
first amendment theorist has concluded that "[i]nformed decisions are
essential to the free enterprise economy just as they are to our political
order."92
The proposition that price information exchanged among producers
and sellers is an integral part of this essential speech was expressly
recognized by Justice Holmes in his dissent in American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States. 93 Justice Holmes stated that "the ideal of
commerce was an intelligent interchange made with full knowledge of
the facts."' 94 Further, he expressed surprise that the majority would
render a decision invalidating the sharing of information "in a country
of free speech that affects to regard education and knowledge as
desirable. ' 95 Justice Brandeis adopted the same view, stating that
"[s]urely it is not against the public interest to distribute knowledge of
trade facts, however detailed. . . . Intelligent conduct of business
implies not only knowledge of trade facts, but an understanding of
them." 96 He concluded that "there is nothing in the Sherman Law
which should limit freedom of discussion, even among traders. '97
Four years later, in Maple Flooring, the majority of the Court
adopted language similar to that of Holmes and Brandeis. The Court
stated that the Sherman Act was not intended to "inhibit the intelligent
conduct of business operations," 98 and concluded that trade is not
restrained "merely because the conduct of commercial operations be-
comes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of all
the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction." 99
Admittedly, the recent commercial speech decisions are largely
consumer oriented rather than seller oriented. ZO In the traditional
91. 425 U.S. at 765.
92. Meiklejohn, suftra note 83, at 440.
93. 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 413.
96. Id. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. 268 U.S. 563, 583 (1925).
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. In Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), there was as clear a concern with consumers' right to receive the information as it was
with the advertisers right to disseminate the information. Similarly, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Court's concern with harassment of consumers was a considera-
tion in denying any first amendment protection for the practices challenged in that case.
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information exchange cases, however, the Court has acknowledged the
importance of intelligent interchange on both sides of the economic
equation: free competition requires "a free and open market among
both buyers and sellers."'' Accordingly, the Court held that the
defendants in Maple Flooring were not engaged in an illegal conspiracy
"merely because they gather and disseminate information . . . bearing
on the business in which they are engaged and make use of it in the
management and control of their individual businesses.' 012 Similarly,
while admitting that the alleged combination involved sellers only,
Justice Holmes argued that the information exchanged in American
Column & Lumber was not secret, but public, and that those on the
other side of the economic relationship, the buyers, were "not less
active in their efforts to know the facts."' 1 3 Notably, in Container
Corp. itself, most of the price information was obtained from the
customers rather than the competitors, a practice not condemned by
the government. ' 0 4
B. Indications from the Court: Conduct versus Speech
Only one of the modern commercial speech cases has alluded to the
problem of price information exchanges as an antitrust violation. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association105 the Court cited price ex-
changes, along with securities and labor law violations, as examples of
areas in which speech was subject to regulation.' 0 6 In order to be
properly evaluated, however, this dictum must be analyzed in the
context of the facts and holding of the case. Ohralik, an attorney, was
sanctioned by the state bar association for engaging in the unethical
activity of persistent in-person and by-mail solicitation of clients. The
defendant challenged the association's regulations, claiming protection
for his activities under the first amendment, but the Supreme Court
rejected his claim and upheld the action taken by the bar association.
The reasoning of the Court merits close examination. Quoting a
pre-Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court reiterated that conduct of
The statement of facts in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U S_ 85. 89
(1977), does reflect, however, some concern for the seller's ability to market a product
101. 268 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 584.
103. 257 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104. 393 U.S. 333, 346 n.4 (1969) (Marshall, J.. dissenting). In this context it is ironic to note
that speech is more likely to be deemed deserving of first amendment protection where there are
not " 'ample alternative channels' " for the particular speech in question Linmark A&ocs, Inc
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). In Container Corp the defendant%
only engaged in the prohibited information exchange where there were no other lawful channels
for the communication. See 393 U.S. at 346 n.4 (Marshall. J , dissenting)
105. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
106. Id. at 456.
1980] 1021
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
which speech is a part may be illegal without violating the first
amendment.107 In keeping with this idea, the Court cited the regula-
tion of information exchanges under the Sherman Act as an example
which "illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is
a component of that activity."108 The Court then held that Ohralik's
activities constituted "a business transaction in which speech is an
essential but subordinate component."' 10 9
The notion that the regulation of speech, pursuant to an important
government interest, is permissible when it is only an incidental
by-product of the legitimate regulation of nonspeech activity has not
arisen only with the advent of the new commercial speech doctrine.
For example, United States v. O'Brien"10 upheld a regulation on
conduct having an incidental effect on speech. O'Brien had been
convicted for the knowing destruction of his draft card in protest
against the Vietnam War. The circuit court agreed with O'Brien that
his first amendment rights had been violated.'' On appeal, the
Supreme Court rejected the first amendment argument, stating that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms.112
Thus, Ohralik's recognition of the principle that regulation of speech
incident to conduct may be permissible does not indicate any general
lowering of the standard of protection to be applied to commercial
speech. Commentators have conceded that the holding in Ohralik, the
only one of the five major modern commercial speech cases in which
the first amendment claim failed, can be explained on the basis of the
conduct involved rather than on the basis of commercial speech." 3
Indeed, the language of the Court seems to militate against any other
conclusion. Thus, with the limited exceptions established in footnote
twenty-four of Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech is to be afforded
the same first amendment protection, and is subject to the same
limitations, as other varieties.
107. Id. at 456 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
108. 436 U.S. at 456.
109. Id. at 457.
110. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
111. 376 F.2d 538, 542 (lst Cir. 1967) (upholding conviction on other grounds). In reviewing
the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme Court was not convinced that the defendant's actions
constituted expressive conduct so as to warrant first amendment protection, but the Court
accepted the speech element of the conduct for purposes of argument. 391 U.S. at 376.
112. 391 U.S. at 376.
113. Roberts, supra note 64, at 137 n.156. As Professor Roberts notes, Ohralik "recognizes
that laws regulating, for example, securities, antitrust, and labor commonly make it illegal to
pursue a course of conduct that necessarily implicates speech." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
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C. The Inappropriateness of a Per Se Rule
The emphasis placed on conduct in cases in which speech is an
"essential but subordinate component" of the regulated activity has
significant implications with respect to the per se approach to informa-
tion exchanges adopted in Container Corp. The Court, in Ohralik,
cited American Column & Lumber, rather than the more recent
Container Corp., as authority for the government's power to regulate
information exchanges. 114 Yet American Column & Lumber required
evidence of conduct, of which speech was only a component, in order
to establish a violation of section 1.115 In light of the Court's recent
extension of protection to commercial speech, it follows that the
establishment of a violation based merely on proof of speech, without
some further evidence of conduct, would not survive scrutiny under
the first amendment.116
The argument advanced by the government in Container Corp. was
not dissimilar to that advanced by the state in Bates v. State Bar. 117 In
Bates, the Court was faced with a first amendment challenge to the
state bar's prohibition on the publication of fees for basic legal ser-
vices. The state argued that, due to the peculiar nature of legal
services, the advertisement of fees was "inherently misleading," there-
fore placing the issue beyond the first amendment's protection.I 8 The
Court rejected the notion that the government could regulate all speech
of a certain type on such a general theory, instead requiring the state to
prove that the particular speech to be regulated falls within the
deceptive advertising exception of footnote twenty-four." 19
In Container Corp. the Court accepted the government's argument
that the structure of an oligopolistic market is such as to make the
exchange of detailed price information inherently a restraint of trade.
It would seem incongruous for this argument to maintain vitality in the
wake of Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark, Bates and Ohralik. 120 Ironi-
114. 436 U.S. at 456.
115. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
116. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const. amend. I. Although the infirmity in this case
rests not in the act of Congress itself, but in the Court's application of the Sherman Act, it is clear
that decisions of the Supreme Court may be invalidated as being unconstitutional. For example,
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that its earlier decision in Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was violative of the tenth amendment. In the context of the first
amendment, court action may be restrained by the Constitution as evidenced by the prior
restraint cases in which courts have been prohibited from enjoining speech prior to publication.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
117. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
118. Id. at 368-69.
119. Id.
120. In at least one instance, a government authority has suggested that first amendment
protection of commercial speech may play a role in antitrust cases. In an opinion issued by the
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cally, Container Corp. itself is the best example of the dangers of
permitting such a sweeping theory of regulation where first amend-
ment rights are involved. The government introduced no evidence as
to levels of profits or prices, and relied instead on the theoretical
assumption that prices must necessarily be maintained at a noncom-
petitive level.1 21 In fact, the relatively inelastic demand meant that
lowering prices could allow a particular firm to capture a greater
market share without increasing the aggregate demand, while the
minimal entry barriers provided a disincentive to maintain prices at an
artificially high level. 122 As a result of these market forces, there was a
"downward trend in prices, with substantial price variations among
defendants and among their different plants," evidencing strong price
competition. 123
Justice Marshall recognized these inconsistencies in the majority's
approach, stating in his dissent that "[i]n the absence of any proof
whatsoever, . . . [i]t is just as likely that price competition was
furthered by the exchange as it is that it was depressed. 11 24 Reviving
the Maple Flooring standard, Justice Marshall concluded that the
government failed to meet its burden of proof that the information
exchange formed the basis of an agreement to fix prices at a noncom-
petitive level. 125 Although agreeing with the underlying proposition of
the majority, namely, that price exchanges may be condemnable in a
truly oligopolistic market, Justice Marshall ultimately thought that the
danger was not "sufficiently high to justify imposing a per se rule
without actual proof. ' 12 6 According to this analysis, the burden of
proof should require the government to introduce evidence, in addition
to the speech, that establishes an intent to fix prices at a noncompeti-
tive level, or that noncompetitive prices actually resulted.
Vermont Attorney General's office, that state's antitrust enforcement agency argued that a
Vermont Board of Public Accounting rule prohibiting solicitation of clients by direct communica-
tion poses first amendment problems in light of recent commercial speech cases. Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 932 at D-3, D-4 (Sept. 20, 1979). This, of course, presents a
two-edged sword. It would be inconsistent for the government to assert first amendment
protection of commercial speech as an additional ground for attacking information restraints
imposed by professional organizations, while denying the impact of the first amendment on
restrictions which the government itself seeks to impose.
121. 393 U.S. 333, 345 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. The possibility of making disproportionately high profits would attract new firms into
the market, encouraged by the low entry barriers. Because the aggregate market demand would
not increase, each individual firm's market share would decrease, as more firms competed for a
share of the market. Accordingly, despite the inflated price structure, total earnings would not
increase. Thus, more rational behavior in this situation would be to engage in competition so as
to capture a greater share of the market while keeping prices at a level which would not attract
additional competition. This is, in fact, the scenario that the market in Container Corp. seemed to
be following. See 393 U.S. at 342-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 345-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The use of per se rules traditionally has been justified by an analysis
approximating a due process balancing test. The per se rules are
applied where "the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh
the losses and... significant administrative advantages will result."' 12 7
This is deemed to be appropriate when "agreements or practices ...
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use." '128 At the time
Container Corp. was decided, the application of a per se rule could
easily have withstood constitutional attack, if not criticism.' 2 9 Since
Virginia Phamnacy, however, application of a per se rule to informa-
tion exchanges, even in an oligopolistic market, would seem to be
strictly prohibited by the Court's interpretation of the scope of first
amendment protection of truthful and legitimate commercial speech.
When first amendment rights are implicated, not even a vast adminis-
trative advantage should justify such an unforgiving standard of the
defendant's guilt.
Of course, if the government were to meet the more stringent burden
of proof argued for in this Article, the contested speech would be
enjoined. This would not be objectionable even under traditional
noncommercial speech notions as it would simply be an example of the
O'Brien incidental regulation analysis. The government would not be
regulating speech itself, as it was permitted to do in Container Corp.,
but, rather, would be regulating a broad course of conduct in which
speech was an "essential but subordinate component."
Similarly, it is not suggested that the government be prohibited from
introducing the speech as important evidence. First, there can be no
objection to the initial facet of the Container Corp. holding-that an
agreement may be inferred from an exchange of information. 130 Thus,
on this point, evidence of the speech might be crucial. What is
objectionable is that an agreement to exchange information would be
127. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
129. Generally, the due process clause imposes only broad limits on economic regulation.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). Indeed, prior to the demise of the commercial speech
exception, the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge on due process grounds to a
proscription against advertising by optometrists. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963). In Head, the Court held that the regulation of advertising did
not violate due process. As to the questions of the evidentiary propriety of per se rules, it has been
held in a different context that the creation of an evidentiary presumption does not violate due
process. Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 398 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1975), aft'd,
567 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1977). Despite the ability of per se rules to withstand a challenge solely
under the due process clause, they have not escaped critical scrutiny. See E. Gelhorn, Antitrust
Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 186-87 (1976). Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Container
Corp. noted that "[p~er se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness." 393 U.S. at 341.
130. 393 U.S. at 335.
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found to be illegal per se. Second, even as to the restraint of trade
ingredient of a section 1 violation, the speech could be offered as
important evidence. As already noted, Ohralik expressly recognizes
that the first amendment does not prohibit regulation of a course of
conduct "'merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evi-
denced, or carried out by means of language. '131
This Article argues for a position such as that recognized by Justice
Holmes in acknowledging that, although an exchange of information
among competitors may be important evidence of a section 1 conspir-
acy, when that is the only evidence on which the prosecution relies, it
"only shows the weakness of the Government's case.' 32 A per se
approach to horizontal price fixing may be appropriate in a case such
as Socony-Vacuum in which the government proves the offense with
evidence of conduct unrelated to speech, but when the government
seeks to rely on the exchange of legitimate and truthful commercial
speech as its primary evidence of price fixing, the Court should not
apply a per se rule in deference to the important first amendment
interests involved.
CONCLUSION
With the demise of the commercial speech exception, a significant
inconsistency has been created in the law. The current activity directed
against oligopolies makes it imperative that this inconsistency be
reconciled. On the one hand, truthful commercial speech may form the
sole basis for an antitrust violation because of the per se rule applied in
Container Corp. On the other hand, that same truthful commercial
speech is protected by the first amendment. If the Court were to
resolve the problem by creating an exception for the Container Corp.
scenario, it would be inviting the same kind of confusion that was
attendant to the first commercial speech exception, and which took
thirty years to unravel. There is a more straightforward way to
reconcile the antitrust principles with the first amendment-requiring
the government to prove that the defendants intended to establish
noncompetitive prices or that such prices actually resulted from an
exchange of price information. By the same token, if the defendants
can refute the government's case, then the price information should be
deemed legitimate commercial speech and no penalty should result.
The Container Corp. per se rule is inconsistent with the fundamental
importance of free speech in our free market system. Thus, it should
be abandoned in favor of a rule of reason which would admit of the
vindication of the defendant's first amendment rights.
131. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (emphasis added).
132. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
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